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Quantum Secret Sharing with Multi-level Mutually (Un-)Biased Bases
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Department of Physics, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, 116, Taiwan
We construct general schemes for multi-partite quantum secret sharing using multi-level systems,
and find that the consistent conditions for valid measurements can be summarized in two simple
algebraic conditions. The scheme using the very high dimensional mutually unbiased bases can in
principle achieve perfect security against intercept-resend attack; and for the scheme using mutually
biased bases, it reaches the optimal but non-perfect security at 4-level system. We also address
the security issue against the general attacks in the context of our multi-level schemes. Especially,
we propose new protocol to enhance both the efficiency and the security against the entanglement-
assisted participant’s attack by incorporating quantum-key-distribution and measurement-basis-
encrypted schemes so that its security is as robust as quantum-key-distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum cryptography is ensured by
the non-cloning theorem [1] so that the eavesdropping via
physical means can always be detected. The schemes for
quantum key distribution(QKD) and secret sharing were
first proposed in [4, 5] and [6, 7], respectively. Both of
the schemes can be thought as the quantum version of
the classical threshold secret sharing (k, n)-scheme [2, 3].
The scheme is designed to distribute valuable information
among n participants so that it can be reconstructed only
if k(≤ n) of them collaborate [18].
Although the quantum secret sharing(QSS) scheme is
better than the classical one in detecting the error caused
by an eavesdropper, it is not perfect. For the common
intercept-resend attack, an eavesdropper can get hold of
some participants’ particles, perform the Bell-state mea-
surement [13] and resend back. The probability of de-
tecting such an attack is only 25 percent for the QSS
scheme [6] using 2-level system. The detecting rate is
quite low if the secret sharing is for some fatal event such
as the release of warheads, for which we hope to have the
perfect security, i.e., 100 percent detecting rate. There-
fore, an important question for QSS is whether one can
have a scheme with the perfect security for attacks such
as intercept-resend. Surprisingly, despite many modified
QSS schemes inspired by the original works [6, 7] in the
past few years, as far as we know, there is no discussion
for such an issue, even in principle.
One straightforward way to increase the detecting rate
against the attacks is to use higher dimensional quan-
tum systems to proceed the QSS. Intuitively, increasing
the dimensions of the quantum bases will complicate the
QSS protocol so that the eavesdropper has more difficulty
to obtain correct information without being detected.
Of course, we will pay the price for reducing the effi-
ciency because we now use the higher dimensional bases
to encode one bit information. This may also complicate
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the consistent conditions for the valid measurements of
the protocol and make the QSS procedure more tedious.
Moreover, the complication of the protocol may again
pose security issues.
In this article we construct the QSS schemes using d-
level systems and establish a security benchmark as a
function of d against the common intercept-resend at-
tack. The results show that in principle the perfect se-
curity against such an attack can be achieved by using
very high dimensional mutually-unbiased bases(MUBs).
Interestingly, we may wonder if the security or error-
detecting rate will always increase by using the higher
dimensional system. We will see that this is subtle, and
we find a counterexample by using the mutually-biased
bases(MBBs) for QSS, which reaches non-perfect opti-
mal security at 4-level system. Our multi-level scheme
is the generalization of [6] for 2-level case. It turns out
that the consistent conditions for valid measurements of
the higher dimensional protocol is quite simple and nat-
ural, and can be summarized in two algebraic conditions.
Moreover, regarding the recent concern on the security of
QSS [14], we will also address the issue in our multi-level
schemes against more general and efficient attacks other
than intercept-resend. We find that one can invalidate
the entanglement-assited participant’s attack devised in
[14] by slightly modifying the protocol proposed in [6].
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section
we will construct the QSS schemes by using the MUBs
and MBBs, respectively. In section III we establish a
security benchmark against the intercept-resend attack.
In section IV we consider the security of our schemes
against more general attacks. Especially, we give a proof
of security against the attack by an outsider Eve with en-
tangled probe. However, we comment that the original
scheme [6] is vulnerable to the the entanglement-assited
participant’s attack devised in [14]. Finally we conclude
our paper in section V by proposing an 100 percent ef-
ficient scheme against the entanglement-assited partici-
pant’s attack by combining the quantum-key-distribution
and measurement-basis-encrypted method.
2II. QUANTUM SECRET SHARING WITH
MUTUALLY UNBIASED BASES
We first consider the (2, 3)-scheme for QSS using the
multi-level MUBs, and later generalize it to the multi-
partite cases. The (2, 3)-scheme is for Alice to distribute
the secret key to both Bob and Charlie, and proceed
the QSS protocol via the local operations and classical
communication(LOCC).
We start with the d-level GHZ state [9], which is shared
among Alice, Bob and Charlie,
|GHZ3〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jjj〉 (1)
each holds one particle in it. The GHZ state is a max-
imally entangled state, and is used for QSS such that
the measurement outcomes of Alice, Bob and Charlie for
their own particles are correlated. Once Bob and Charlie
combine their outcomes of measurements, they can know
Alice’s.
A typical QSS protocol runs as following [6, 7]. (i)
Alice prepares the GHZ state, and then distributes the
corresponding particles to Bob and Charlie, respectively.
(ii) Alice, Bob and Charlie perform the local measure-
ments on their own particles by randomly choosing the
measurement bases. (iii) Bob and Charlie then announce
their measurement bases publicly to Alice, but not their
outcomes. (iv) Alice then determines if the measurement
bases satisfy the consistent conditions encoded by the
GHZ state, which can be summarized in a lookup table.
If so, they keep the outcomes as the useful key and ex-
amine further if there is eavesdropping. If there is, then
just discard the results. (v) Repeat the above procedure
to collect enough outcomes for the secret information.
When necessary, Bob and Charlie can collaborate to re-
produce Alice’s information.
We will adopt the above protocol for the QSS using d-
level GHZ state (1). However, in the end we will modify
this protocol to enhance both the security and efficiency
of QSS. The modification will incorporate both QKD and
measurement-basis-encrypted scheme [15].
As noted in [10, 11], it is possible to find d+ 1 MUBs
in d dimensions only if d is (any power of) an odd prime.
Besides the canonical basis {|j〉, j = 0, ..., d − 1}, the
explicit forms of the remaining d sets of MUBs are
|Pp〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
eiφ(Pj
2+pj)|j〉, φ = 2π
d
(2)
where P (runs from 1 to d) denotes the basis and p (runs
from 0 to d − 1) labels the vector in a given orthonor-
mal basis [19]. They are mutually unbiased because the
overlap is
|〈Pp|P ′p′〉| =
1√
d
for P 6= P ′, (3)
which follows from the Gauss sums of number theory
valid for odd prime d.
From (3) we can derive the consistent condi-
tions for a valid measurement. To arrive that,
let us assume that Bob and Charlie hold the
states |Bb〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 e
iφ(Bj2+bj)|j〉 and |Cc〉 =
1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 e
iφ(Cj2+cj)|j〉, respectively. Then, take the in-
ner product between the GHZ state and the 2-particle
state |Bb〉|Cc〉, we obtain
(〈Bb|〈Cc|)|GHZ3〉 = 1
d
√
d
d−1∑
j=0
e−iφ((B+C)j
2+(b+c)j)|j〉
which after normalization should match with Alice’s state
|Aa〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 e
iφ(Aj2+aj)|j〉 in order to make a valid
measurement for secret sharing. This then implies the
following consistent conditions:
A+B + C = 0 (mod d), (4)
a+ b+ c = 0 (mod d). (5)
According to these, we can write down a d2×d2 lookup
table for the use of QSS protocol using the d-level system.
This is the straightforward generalization for the d = 2
case. In QSS protocol[6, 7], one first checks if condition
(4) satisfies or not by LOCC. If yes, it is a valid measure-
ment and (5) follows; otherwise, the measurement will
be discarded. Importantly, the conciseness of conditions
(4) and (5) helps to simplify the practical en/de-coding
procedures in QSS. On the other hand, condition (4) im-
plies that the efficiency is 1/d since only one out of d
cases makes a valid measurement, and condition (5) can
be used to detect eavesdropping for valid measurements.
Quantum secret sharing with mutually biased bases.—
The above generalizes the QSS scheme of [6, 7] using
MUBs. Now we look for the scheme using MBBs which
has not been discussed before in literatures.
Our construction of the d-level MBBs for QSS is as
follows. Start with the Fourier transform of the canonical
basis
|uk〉F = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
eikjφ|j〉, k = 0, .., d− 1, φ = 2π
d
.
We then introduce the following d MBBs
|Pp〉 = |up〉F + 1√
d
(eiPφ − 1)|0〉 (6)
for P = 0, .., d − 1, p = 0, .., d − 1. Note that |0j〉 =
|uj〉F . For simplicity, here and hereafter we use the same
notation as for MUBs.
We now show that these bases will form a consistent
lookup table for QSS. Note that the overlap
〈Pp|P ′p′〉 = δpp′ +
1
d
[ei(P
′−P )φ − 1]. (7)
3Thus, each basis {|Pp〉, p = 0, .., d − 1} is orthonormal
and complete, and the overlap |〈Pp|P ′p′〉| between differ-
ent bases will depend on P ′ − P and so is called biased
except for d = 3 case, which is the same as d = 3 MUBs’.
Similar to the case for MUBs, if Bob and Charlie hold
the states |Bb〉 = |ub〉F + 1√
d
(eiBφ − 1)|0〉 and |Cc〉 =
|uc〉F + 1√
d
(eiCφ − 1)|0〉 respectively, we should require
the state (〈Bb|〈Cc|)|GHZ3〉 to match Alice’s state |Aa〉 =
|ua〉F + 1√
d
(eiAφ − 1)|0〉 for a valid measurement. This
then yields the same consistent conditions (4) and (5) for
a valid measurement as for MUBs.
It is straightforward to generalize the above tri-partite
scheme to the multi-partite one. We just start with the
n-partite GHZ state
|GHZn〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jjj...j〉123...n. (8)
Each party measures her/his own particle and obtains
the outcome in one of the d bases, say {|Pp〉}. To have
a consistent lookup table for n-partite case, we should
require (up to some normalization factor)
|Aa〉 = (〈Bb|〈Cc|〈Dd| · · · 〈Ωω |)|GHZn〉
which yields the following consistent conditions
A+B + C + ...+Ω = 0 (mod d), (9)
a+ b+ c+ ...+ ω = 0 (mod d). (10)
These are straightforward generalization of (4) and (5),
respectively. Note that because of (3) or (7), condition
(9) implies (10) but not vice versa.
III. DETECTING THE INTERCEPT-RESEND
ATTACK
We like to give a benchmark formula for the detecting
rate against the very common intercept-resend attack as
a function of dimension d. The attack goes as follows for
tri-partite case: the dishonest Charlie* gets hold of Bob’s
particle and performs the general Bell-state measurement
on his two-particle state, then resends one particle to
Bob. Since Charlie* does not know Alice’s measurement
basis, he may use the wrong base for his Bell-state mea-
surement but still has some probability to get the right
result. On the other hand, if Charlie* happens to use
the right base, he will then know Bob’s measurement
outcome and then Alice’s after LOCC without making
detectable error.
The detecting rate against the attack can be de-
rived as follows. Let us assume that Alice’s mea-
surement outcome is |Aa〉, However, Charlie* thinks
Alice was using the base {|A′a′〉} and expands his
two-particle state in such a base, i.e., 〈Aa|GHZ3〉 =∑d−1
a′=0〈Aa|A′a′〉〈A′a′ |GHZ3〉. A detectable error occurs
if the condition (4) holds but (5) is violated, and its rate
is 1− |〈A′a′ |Aa〉|2. Then, the average detecting rate over
the configurations satisfying (4) but not (5) is
PE :=
d−1∑
A−A′=1
1
d
d−1∑
a′=0
|〈Aa|A′a′〉|2(1− |〈A′a′ |Aa〉|2). (11)
For the scheme using MUBs, by (3) the detecting rate
(11) is
PE,MUBs(d) = (
d− 1
d
)2. (12)
It is a monotonically increasing function of d so that
higher dimensional system is more secure. Especially, it
approaches unity as d goes to infinity and implies perfect
security, in principle.
For the cases using MBBs, by (7) we find that
PE,MBBs(d) =
4d2 − 10d+ 6
d3
. (13)
In contrast to MUBs’ case, it is not a monotonic function
of d because of the weighted overlap between bases. In-
stead, it reaches the maximal at d = 4 with PE,MBBs(d =
4) = 1532 , and then decreases to zero monotonically for
d > 4. Moreover, PE,MUBs(d = 3) = PE,MBBs(d =
3) = 49 as expected because our MUBs and MBBs are
the same for d = 3. Recall that the detecting rate for the
2-level scheme of [6] is only 1/4, so even the lower d(> 2)
schemes using MBBs have higher security than the 2-
level case. Since the MUBs’ scheme is only available for
odd prime d, the d = 4 MBBs’ case can be considered as
the optimal scheme for a compromise between the degree
of security and the efficiency. Practically, one can phys-
ically realize the d = 4 system by combining two 2-level
systems to carry out the optimal MBBs’ scheme; for ex-
ample, the para- and ortho-helium spectra can be seen as
a d = 4 system by appropriately adjusting the external
magnetic/electric fields.
Estimating the detecting rate in the multi-partite sys-
tem is more complicated, we will not discuss the details
here. However, the more persons share the entangled key,
the more difficult it is for the eavesdropper to collect all
the other’s particles and the more secure the scheme is.
IV. SECURITY AGAINST GENERAL
EAVESDROPPERS
Enforcing the security of the cryptography is state-of-
the-art, so is its attack strategy. After establishing a se-
curity benchmark against the common intercept-resend
attack, we like to address the issue for more general at-
tacks which could be more efficient than expected for an
eavesdropper (called Eve) using the ancilla probe.
First, we consider the case that Eve is not the member
sharing the secret via GHZ state. Then, the QSS scheme
4is secure provided that GHZ state is the only state satis-
fying the consistent conditions (9) and (10). Otherwise,
there will be a set of fake key states {|FK〉} other than
the GHZ satisfying (9) and (10), and Eve can use the an-
cilla states {|E〉FK} and |E〉GHZ to form the entangled
state
|Ψ〉 = |GHZn〉|E〉GHZ +
∑
{|FK〉}
|FK〉|E〉FK . (14)
She can then extract the encoded secret information in
the GHZ state by performing the general Bell-state mea-
surement without making detectable errors. We now
show that GHZ state is indeed the unique one satisfy-
ing (9) and (10).
The proof constructed for the 2-level scheme is given
in [6] by showing that all the states orthogonal to the
GHZ state do not satisfy the consistent conditions (9)
and (10). This procedure will be far more involved for
the multi-level case. Instead, we directly show
|〈Λ|Φ〉| < |〈Λ|GHZn〉| (15)
for any state |Φ〉 belonging to the vector space V ⊥GHZ
which is orthogonal to GHZ state, and the conditional
states |Λ〉’s representing the consistent conditions (9) and
(10), i.e.,
|Λ〉 = |Aa〉|Bb〉|Cc〉...|Ωω〉,
with the states’ labels satisfying (9) and (10). This im-
plies that none of the states in V ⊥GHZ will satisfy all the
dn−1 conditions given by (9) and (10). The state |Ψ〉
in (14) will then reduce to the product of GHZ and an-
cilla states so that Eve cannot obtain useful information
through entanglement without making detectable errors.
We start the proof by constructing the basis vectors
for V ⊥GHZ in terms of the canonical basis {|ijk · · · 〉} via
Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process. Then, there
arrive two kinds of basis states: (1) there are dn− d unit
vectors in the canonical basis which do not belong to the
subset made of GHZ state, i.e.,
|Φ〉⊥,1 := |ijk · · · 〉 6= |ℓℓℓ · · · 〉
with i, j, k, ℓ · · · = 0, 1, 2, . . . , d−1; (2) there are the other
d− 1 basis vectors taking the following form
|Φ〉⊥,2 =
d−1∑
j=0
cj |jjj · · · 〉,
and the orthogonality to GHZ state requires
∑d−1
j=0 cj = 0
besides the normalization condition
∑d−1
j=0 |cj |2 = 1.
Before we check if states |Φ〉⊥,1 and |Φ〉⊥,2 satisfy (15),
we note that
〈Λ|jjj · · · 〉 = d−n2 (16)
for any conditional state |Λ〉 so that
〈Λ|GHZn〉 = d1−n2 . (17)
These two imply that while checking (15) we can treat
all the dn−1 conditional states equally, it then helps to
simplify the task. Condition (16) then yields 〈Λ|Φ〉⊥,2 =
d−
n
2
∑d−1
j=0 cj = 0 for any |Λ〉 so that the second type of
basis vectors are orthogonal to all the conditional states
and thus are excluded from the set {|FK〉} in (14). On
the other hand, from (17) for the first kind of basis vec-
tors we have |〈Λ|Φ〉⊥,1| = d−n2 < 〈Λ|GHZn〉 for any
conditional state |Λ〉 so that they are also excluded from
the set {|FK〉} in (14). This then completes our proof.
However, the uniqueness of GHZ state does not guar-
antee QSS’ security if Charlie* is dishonest with the help
of an ancilla Eve to entangle with Bob’s particle. This
is the entanglement-assisted participant’s attack. In [14],
an explicit attacking scheme via manipulating GHZ state
with ancilla was devised so that AB’s and CE’s states
are maximally entangled [20]
|Ψ〉ABCE = 1
d
d−1∑
a,b=0
|A¯a〉|B¯b〉 ⊗ |ψ(A¯B¯)ab 〉CE (18)
where the bar quantity means its value is chosen and
fixed, and {|ψ(A¯B¯)ab 〉CE} is an orthonormal complete set
for Alice’s and Bob’s chosen basis A¯ and B¯, respec-
tively. After Alice and Bob measure their particles in
bases A¯ and B¯ with the outcomes a = a¯ and b = b¯ re-
spectively, then the state (18) collapses to |ψ(A¯B¯)
a¯b¯
〉CE .
Since {|ψ(A¯B¯)ab 〉CE} is orthonormal and Charile* knows
Alice’s and Bob’s measurement basis, he can perform lo-
cal unitary transformations to extract the a¯ and b¯ from
|ψ(A¯B¯)
a¯b¯
〉CE without making detectable error as shown in
[14]. In a sense, the multi-level QSS scheme using proto-
col of [6] is highly insecure.
V. AN EFFICIENT SCHEME AGAINST
ENTANGLEMENT-ASSISTED PARTICIPANT’S
ATTACK
We now propose a modified protocol to remedy the
above security loop-hole. Moreover, it will enhance the
efficiency of QSS from 1/d to 100 percent. The modi-
fication is two-fold. One is to adopt the measurement-
basis-encrypted efficient QSS scheme proposed in [15] as
follows: Instead for the participants to announce their
measurement basis in order to verify if they satisfy (9) for
the valid measurements, they will use their measurement
outcomes as the measurement basis for the next run. As
long as the first run is a valid measurement, then all the
subsequent runs will be automatically the valid measure-
ments as seen from (9) and (10). This yields 100 percent
efficiency. Moreover, since Charile* does not know about
others’ chosen bases and thus cannot take advantage of
the entangled state (18), he has no way to extract other’s
measurement outcomes from such a state |ψ(A¯B¯)ab 〉CE . By
guess, he has only 1/d chance to do it right. The remain-
ing modification is to ensure the first run can be a valid
5measurement without announcing the measurement ba-
sis. This can be done by using multi-level QKD for Alice
to distribute a valid set of measurement basis to each
participant separately. The eavesdropper can of course
attack QKD, too. However, the QKD security is more
robust than QSS’s and has been studied extensively, e.g.
see [16]. An alternative against the attack of [14] is con-
sidered in [17] for multi-level QSS recently.
In this paper, we have generalized the QSS scheme
for qubits to the multi-level cases with both MUBs and
MBBs. We also discuss the security issues for general
attacks. Finally we propose an efficient and secure pro-
tocol which could be relevant to the physical realization
of QSS.
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